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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) has been very active in enforcing antitrust laws in the health care field for the past two decades. The staff has investigated a wide variety of cases covering a broad
range of restrictions on competition. These cases can be divided into three
basic types of cases in health care: (1) mergers and acquisitions, (2) horizontal restraints cases or agreements among competitors, and (3) input market
monopolization cases, such as hospital privileges cases. The Commission
relies on both legal and economic analysis in all of these cases. As Chairman
Steiger of the Federal Trade Commission has stated, antitrust policy has
been "increasingly reshaped by analysis based on economic theory."' This
article attempts to explain the economic analysis used in antitrust enforcement as applied to the first two of the three types of health care cases. Section I presents the basic economic framework that is used to assess the
competitive implications of health care mergers and acquisitions. Section II
describes the analysis applied to other agreements among competitors in the
health care field and briefly explains how this analysis differs in other health
care cases.
I.

HEALTH CARE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

Health care mergers have accounted for a large portion of antitrust enforcement activity. In 1981 the Commission issued its first hospital merger
complaint in American Medical International,Inc.2 Since that time, several
other hospital mergers have been challenged.' Health care providers that
have been investigated include both general acute care hospitals, as well as
more specialized institutions, such as psychiatric or rehabilitation hospitals
or nursing homes. Other health care providers potentially subject to investigation in an acquisition may include outpatient or ambulatory surgery centers, physician practices, and vertically integrated insurer-providers, such as
health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Because most of the acquisitions investigated by the Commission have been hospital mergers, what follows is a general description of the economic analysis involved in a hospital
merger.
A. Economic Models
The FTC's Bureau of Economics has traditionally used two basic classes
1. J. Steiger, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Remarks on the New Directions in Antitrust Enforcement Before National Economic Research Associates (July 5, 1990).
2. 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984).
3. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 298 (1985); Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361
(1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987); Reading
Hosp., 55 Fed. Reg. 15,290 (FTC consent order No. C-3284 issued Apr. 10, 1990).

1991]

Economic Analysis In Health Care Antitrust

of economic models to explain equilibrium price determination in markets
with a small number of sellers: the "dominant firm" models and the "collusion" models. The dominant firm models analyze the behavior of a "large"
firm in the presence of a competitive fringe of price takers.4 The collusion
models5 analyze the behavior of a small number of relatively large firms,
each too small to exercise market power unilaterally, but which collectively
are large enough that anticompetitive behavior may be possible if the firms
take into account the likely actions of rivals. The analysis of hospital mergers may apply to both sets of models. Some recent mergers have taken place
in small, geographically isolated communities where the number of hospitals
is quite small (e.g., two or three). In these instances, the merged entity will
possibly be in a position to exercise market power unilaterally. In other
cases,6 the number of hospitals in the relevant geographic market, even after
the merger, may be too high for the merging hospitals to raise prices on their
own. Even in these instances, however, there is a real possibility that the
number of competitors is small enough to create cooperative behavior. 7
1.

The Dominant Firm Model

In the dominant firm model, a single firm may be able to raise its price
unilaterally and consequently increase its profits. The ability of an individ4. In one early hospital merger case, United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 198081 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,721 (E.D. La. Oct. 9, 1980), the court ruled that HAI's posttransaction market share of 72.9% would "approachn monopoly proportions" and concluded
that such a share would have adverse competitive. effects. Id. at 77,853 (preliminary injunction
granted based upon "a reasonable probability that the Government could prevail in its effort to
show that Section 7 of the Clayton Act would be violated" (citation omitted)).
5. Economists have developed a large number of models that attempt to determine the
price and output effects of market structures characterized by a small number of sellers. These
models normally predict an inverse relationship between prices and the number of sellers,
holding other factors constant. This relationship derives from "an increased awareness of significant mutual interdependence among rivals as well as from the higher probability of detection and punishment of 'cheaters' in an oligopoly setting." Pautler, A Review of the Economic
Basis for Broad-Based Horizontal-MergerPolicy, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 574 (1983).
Under current antitrust standards, however, a high post-merger level of concentration is regarded more as a "necessary" than a "sufficient" condition to trigger an enforcement action.
The typical antitrust inquiry is likely to focus on additional factors that may affect the degree
of post-acquisition interfirm rivalry. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER
GUIDELINES (1984) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
6., See, e.g., Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
7. Under certain circumstances, even noncooperative behavior may lead to less than optimal industry performance when the number of competitors decreases. See, e.g., R. Willig,
Remarks at New York State Bar Association: Antitrust Law Section Symposium 107-12 (Jan.
16, 1990); J. Rill, Remarks in Report from Official Washington: Merger Enforcement at the
Department of Justice (Mar. 23, 1990).
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ual firm to set and maintain a supracompetitive price is a function of-the
elasticity of the demand curve facing that firm, defined by the responsiveness
of consumers and alternative suppliers to changes in relative prices. This
elasticity will be determined by the firm's market share, the price elasticity of
the market demand function, and the price elasticity of supply of the competitive fringe. 8 Strictly speaking, a large market share is neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition for the exercise of market power. A merger between
a group of competing firms in a particular geographic market could result in
those firms having a large market share for a particular set of products and
services. Nonetheless, the enterprise created by this consolidation might not
have the ability to establish and maintain a supracompetitive price structure
if consumers and competitors are sufficiently responsive to changes in relative prices. As an example, consider the case of a hypothetical merger of
plastic surgery practices. Even if the combined firm was to achieve a market
share of seventy percent for elective plastic surgery, it most likely would not
be able to raise prices to a supracompetitive level without either inducing
customers to choose a different supplier or inducing other plastic surgeons to
establish a practice in the area. Therefore, while market share is certainly
important in the determination of whether a firm can raise prices unilaterally, it is not the only relevant factor.
2.

The Collusion Model

In situations where no dominant firm is created, but the number of remaining competitors is still small, the question becomes whether there is a
sufficient likelihood of reduced competitive performance to warrant an enforcement action. Although there are a large number of economic models in
which noncompetitive outcomes emerge from noncooperative behavior, the
antitrust enforcement agencies tend to focus more on the possibility of cooperative (i.e., collusive) behavior arising in the aftermath of the transaction.9
Collusive behavior is often profitable if it is successfully orchestrated.
However, the characteristics of a particular market may make sustained co8. Formally, the price elasticity of market demand equals the percentage change in services demanded divided by the percentage change in prices. If a price change produces a greater
percentage change in the quantity demanded, the demand for the product is termed elastic.
Conversely, if a price change produces a less than commensurate change in the quantity demanded, demand is said to be inelastic.
9. The DOJ Merger Guidelines appear to focus principally on the likelihood of cooperative behavior, stating that "[i]f
collective action is necessary [for market power to be exercised], an additional constraint applies. As the number of firms necessary to control a given
percentage of total supply increases, the difficulties and costs of reaching and enforcing consensus with respect to control of that supply also increase." MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5,
at 13.
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operative behavior highly unlikely. While some features of the hospital industry increase the likelihood of successful collusion, other features
undermine cooperative behavior. These features include: the extent of product heterogeneity; the number of different services that the potential colluders produce and sell; the number of dimensions along which competition
takes place; the local regulatory environment; the development of nontraditional alternatives to inpatient hospital care; the existence of large, sophisticated buyers in the market; and the existence of information asymmetries
among rival firms.
The information that cartel participants can obtain about their rivals' actions is a key to cartel stability. One theory based on this insight implies that
several conditions will facilitate the establishment and maintenance of a tacit
or explicit cartel.' ° First, homogeneity of the goods and services simplifies
the nature of the collusive agreement; complicated agreements are more difficult to enforce than simple ones.'" Second, a small number of rivals are
easier to monitor, which simplifies coordination. 2 Third, a large number of
buyers stabilizes a cartel. When the number of buyers is large, relative to the
number of sellers, additional business will be attracted only by making a
large number of price cuts. This increases the likelihood that rivals will become aware of the price cuts and thereby deters price cutting. Of course, if a
few large buyers exist in conjunction with many small buyers, significant
sales might be obtained by making secret price reductions to the large purchasers.' 3 Fourth, buyer loyalty, as measured by the probability of a repeat
purchase absent a price cut, increases cartel stability because sellers can accurately attribute the loss of a customer to price cutting by rivals.' 4 Fifth, a
lack of new customers entering the market also contributes to cartel success. " A price cut is more likely to be detected if all of the price cutter's
additional sales come solely from the existing customers of rivals, rather
than from a mixture of old and new customers.' 6
10. See Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44 (1964).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 51.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 45, 51.
15. Id. at 48.
16. In addition to these standard cartel problems, hospital markets may present a unique
impediment to collusion. The existence of for-profit providers, not-for-profit providers, and
government-owned hospitals (all of whose goals may differ) in a given market may make it
difficult for potential colluders to reach an agreement on collusive price, quantity, or quality
levels. For a discussion of some factors that might facilitate or deter collusion among hospitals, see Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp.
1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), afl'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990).
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3. Market Power
In both the dominant firm and collusion models, a hypothetical monopolist must have market power in order profitably to increase prices. The exercise of market power requires: 1) low demand elasticity, i.e., few consumers
will switch to alternatives or stop buying in the event of a price increase; 2)
low supply elasticity, i.e., other producers fail to increase supply to take advantage of the increased margins available as a result of an anticompetitive
price increase; and 3) existing barriers to prevent new producers from entering the market to obtain the supranormal profits earned by incumbent firms.
The elasticity of market demand for a good or service is generally determined by the availability of substitutes for that good or service. If there are
products or services that consumers regard as acceptable substitutes at a
competitive price, then the demand elasticity will be large. If market demand elasticity is sufficiently high, even a monopolist will be unable to raise
prices significantly above the competitive level; any attempt to do so would
induce customers to switch from the monopolist's product to one of the alternatives. This loss in sales could cause the monopolist's profits to fall,
thereby compelling it to rescind the price increase.
For the purpose of antitrust analysis, hospital markets are generally
thought to have two relevant dimensions to demand elasticity: a geographic
dimension and a product dimension. Hospitals are generally thought to
compete in markets that are local in character. A hospital's geographic market might be as small as a city; if the city is sufficiently large, the market
might consist of some portion of this area. In this case, the relevant question
is the extent to which consumers perceive hospitals located outside this area
as an economical substitute for those located within the proposed market's
boundaries. If these outside hospitals are regarded as close substitutes for
the hospital(s) in the market, then the latter may face a constraint on its
ability to exercise market power.17
The second dimension of hospital markets centers on the availability of
substitutes for a product or service. The issue is whether acceptable substitutes for hospital services exist which can be exploited in the event of an
attempted exercise of market power through the principal's increasing the
price of hospital services to the monopoly level. Recent years have witnessed the growth of hospital alternatives, such as surgi-centers, emergi-centers, birthing centers, free-standing radiology centers, and ambulatory care
centers, all of which provide services that formerly were obtainable primarily
at hospitals. Furthermore, many procedures that previously were performed
17. Whether outside hospitals are close substitutes will depend upon whether the outside
hospitals possess sufficient capacity to satisfy an increase in demand.
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on an inpatient basis are now commonly available in physicians' offices. If
these sources of supply can be substituted for services traditionally provided
by hospitals, then even a monopolist hospital might have little or no market
power. On the other hand, services produced by these nonhospital providers
may be perceived as acceptable substitutes only for a small subset of the total
array of services currently produced by hospitals. In this case, a category of
hospital services subject to supracompetitive pricing could still exist.
The final determinant of the market power of a dominant firm or cartel is
the elasticity of the fringe supply. This factor is determined by the speed
with which the price-taking smaller competitors expand their output,
thereby forcing the market price back to the competitive level. If the expansion of output is sufficiently large and accomplished in a sufficiently short
period of time, then the market power of the dominant firm will be constrained. To illustrate, suppose that a merger between two short-term general hospitals creates an alleged dominant firm in the market for "inpatient
services"' 8 in a designated geographic market. The ability of fringe suppliers to constrain the pricing power of this firm would depend upon factors
such as the amount of excess capacity controlled by the competitive fringe,
the ability of incumbent fringe suppliers to expand capacity, the ability of
specialty providers (psychiatric or pediatric hospitals) to convert beds to
general acute care, and the ability of de novo entrants to build capacity.
Hospital markets are somewhat unusual in that oftentimes a complex system
of laws and regulations 19 restricts and diminishes the types of supply responses that a unilateral increase in price-cost margins normally would
elicit.
B. Antitrust Markets and the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Merger Guidelines define
an antitrust market as a product or group of products located within a geographic area where the products are sold. A monopolist seller of those products in that area could permanently raise their prices above the current
presumably competitive level. The Guidelines generally use the "smallest
market" principle in defining both markets: The relevant markets are
deemed to be the smallest product group and the smallest area which contain the merger partners and within which a price increase could be ef18. This definition has been commonly adopted in antitrust proceedings. See Hospital
Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 384-85 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
19. An obvious example is certificate-of-need (CON) regulation, which controls expansions of hospital capacity. See, e.g., Sherman, The Effect of State Certificate of Need Laws on
Hospital Costs (Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission 1988).
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fected. 20 The DOJ algorithm establishes a hypothetical market that contains
the merger partners and then determines whether a monopolist in this market could permanently raise prices. If product substitution or an increase in
supply would defeat such an attempt, the products and/or suppliers that
impose this competitive constraint would be incorporated into a revised market definition. This process is repeated until product substitution and supply
expansions no longer constrain the behavior of the hypothetical monopolist.
The ultimate market definition is characterized by small values both for the
market demand and for the fringe supply elasticities. The antitrust market
thus consists of those firms and those goods and services which substantially
constrain the behavior of the merging firms.
1. Product Market
a.

The "Cluster of Services" Approach

Any antitrust analysis requires the analyst to develop an initial service or
set of services that might constitute an antitrust "product market." This has
proven to be a challenging endeavor in the case of hospital mergers.
Unlike many firms, hospitals do not produce a single, homogeneous output. They are extraordinarily heterogeneous institutions, producing a diverse array of services. The typical short-term, general care hospital is
perhaps the quintessential multi-product enterprise, combining a broad collection of labor and nonlabor inputs to produce a large set of outputs. The
American Hospital Association (AHA) classification system employs a list
of fifty-four service codes to indicate whether an institution offers services
such as open heart surgery, inpatient hemodialysis, diagnostic and therapeutic radioscope facilities, and pediatric inpatient care.2 Further, in addition
to providing the customary set of medical/surgical inpatient services, hospitals are increasingly reliant on the production of a large array of outpatient
services as a source of revenue.
In an antitrust context, one way to assess the likely competitive implications of a hospital acquisition is to treat each of these individual services as a
separate hypothetical product market and perform the usual merger analysis
on a service-by-service basis. However, in virtually all of the hospital merger
cases involving acute care hospitals that have been litigated by the FTC and
the DOJ through the time of this article, the FTC cases and the courts have
20. As David Scheffman and Pablo Spiller have shown, this technique for delineating
market boundaries is derived from the concept of demand elasticity. Scheffman & Spiller,
Geographic Market Definition Under the U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 30 J. L.
& EcON. 123, 125 (Apr. 1987).
21.

See generally AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO THE HEALTH CARE

FIELD (1988).
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applied a product market defined by the cluster of services offered by shortterm, acute care hospitals.2 2 The economic rationale for the "cluster" approach is based upon some core set of services provided by hospitals that
either (1) cannot be produced outside the setting of a traditional hospital or
(2) are characterized by such strong complementarities in production and
consumption (scope economies) that the cost of jointly producing the cluster
is well below the cost of individually producing and consuming the cluster's
components.23 Dependingon the strength of these complementarities, a monopolist producer of this service cluster could raise its price to a supracompetitive level without making it attractive for consumers to assemble their
own cluster through services obtained from a variety of independent nonhospital providers. Examples of services that might make up this cluster are
room and board for medical/surgical patients, twenty-four hour observation,
nursing services, laboratory and X-ray services, intensive and coronary care,
and ancillary support services.24
Of the various criteria employed by the Commission staff to establish the
case for a cluster market, the most compelling from an economic perspective
are those that focus on the cost and demand complementarities existing between the cluster's components.25 If this focus is adopted, the rationale for
including all types of hospital services while excluding nonhospital outpatient services in a product market definition is questionable. The inpatient
service complementarities described above appear principally to derive from
22. The first hospital merger case brought by a federal antitrust agency involved specialty,
rather than acute care, hospitals. In 1980 the DOJ challenged the acquisition of a private
psychiatric hospital in New Orleans by Health Affiliates International (HAI), which owned or
managed two other private psychiatric hospitals in the area. The case appears to have been
decided largely on a "structural" basis (i.e., it lacked an extensive assessment of the economic
factors affecting competition). The court granted the DOJ's request for a preliminary injunction under section 7 of the Clayton Act, concluding that the respondent's post-acquisition

72.9% market share "approache[d] monopoly proportions." United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)

63,721, at 77,853 (E.D. La. Oct. 9, 1980) (reason-

able probability standard of review) (citation omitted).
23.

A noneconomic rationale for using the "cluster" definition is that it is simply inconve-

nient to carry out a separate antitrust analysis for each individual member of a set of services,
even though the existence of antitrust markets for individual services might be conceptually
justified. Although the antitrust authorities have, until now, used the cluster approach, condi-

tions could easily arise that would justify enforcement actions based upon likely competitive
harm in some subset of the traditional hospital cluster market.
24. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987);
modified, 104 F.T.C. 617 (1984), modified,
25. Some of the other market definition

361, 464-65 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir.
American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 17,
107 F.T.C. 310 (1986).
criteria sometimes used in litigated cases are unin-

formative or misleading. This is particularly true of the "statutory recognition" criterion,
which emphasizes that regulatory authorities recognize hospitals as a distinct type of provider.

This criterion is devoid of economic content.
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the large transaction cost savings available when a bundle of jointly consumed ancillary and support services are physically proximate to one another. If this view is correct, then it is not clear what, if any,
complementarities exist between a hospital's inpatient and outpatient services. The empirical literature on hospital costs has actually obtained mixed
evidence on the existence of these scope economies. 26 Absent such cost complementarities, a hospital's cost of providing a bundle of outpatient services
likely would not fall below that of a free-standing ambulatory care center.
Hence, a hospital or a cartel of hospitals may not be able to establish
supracompetitive prices for outpatient services without losing sales to freestanding competitors. The implication is, therefore, that either nonhospital
providers of outpatient care should be included in the relevant antitrust market or that the market should be restricted to include only inpatient services.
Although formal empirical analyses of the competitive impact of nonhospital outpatient providers are not available, anecdotal evidence from the hospital trade press suggests both that (1) free-standing outpatient facilities
produce a similar range of services and compete for the same group of patients as do hospital outpatient departments and (2) the range of services
available on an outpatient basis is constantly expanding.27
26. Thomas Cowing and Alphonse Holtmann found that there actually may be scope
diseconomies between the provision of emergency room services and inpatient services. See
generally Cowing & Holtmann, Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost Functions: Empirical
Evidence and Policy Implicationsfrom Cross-Section Data, 49 S. ECON. J. 637 (1983). Another

study found that there are scope diseconomies between emergency and inpatient care. Additionally, it found evidence of scope diseconomies between other types of outpatient (e.g., surgery outpatient visits, orthopedic outpatient visits) and inpatient services. See Grannemann,
Brown & Pauly, Estimating Hospital Costs: A Multiple Output Analysis, 5 J. HEALTH ECON.

107, 126 (1986) [hereinafter Grannemann]; see also Vita, Exploring Hospital Production Relationships with Flexible FunctionalForms, 9 J. HEALTH EON. 1, 19 (1990) (no strong evidence

of weak cost complementaries). But see Fournier & Mitchell, The Impact of Competition for
Hospital Services: A Multiproduct Cost Analysis (Nov. 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that small-but not large-hospitals experience scope economies between inpatient and

outpatient services).
27. The inconsistency inherent in an "all hospital services" cluster market definition that
excludes nonhospital outpatient services was recognized by the Commission in its Hospital
Corp. opinion. Although neither the Hospital Corporation of America nor the Commission
staff appealed the administrative law judge's product market finding, the Commission noted

the existence of a substantial volume of evidence showing that hospitals and nonhospitals compete for outpatients. It also maintained, however, that hospitals nonetheless produce an inpa-

tient service cluster "that bears little relation to outpatient care." Hospital Corp. of Am,, 106
F.T.C. 361, 465 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038

(1987). The Commission concluded that the conceptually appropriate product market may be
that which excludes all outpatient services and is instead restricted to the core of services
which, given current prices and medical technology, have no close outpatient substitutes.' Id.

In light of the analysis presented above, this appears to be an internally consistent definition
that is empirically valid. Nonetheless, every year more and more services cross the inpatient/
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The cluster of services approach to hospital market definition is not universally accepted. Jonathan Baker has criticized the cluster market approach in hospital mergers.2" He characterizes the cluster approach as
"remarkable" because it "asserts antitrust relevance to collections of products and services that are not substitutes. 2 9 Baker argues instead that complementarity is viewed best as a factor affecting firms' ability to collude; the
value of the cluster market approach is limited to analytical convenience.3"
This article, however, concludes that defining antitrust markets on the basis of complementarities is both sensible and consistent with the Merger
Guidelines approach. Virtually every firm unites some collection of complementary inputs which it transforms into one or more outputs. Whether this
conglomeration of services collectively represents an antitrust market depends upon the cost to consumers of assembling their own outputs from this
collection of inputs in response to a price increase. In many situations this
cost will be prohibitively high, which supports the view that the cluster approach is economically sensible. A new automobile, for example, is a cluster
consisting of a wide variety of different types of automotive parts. A literal
reading of Baker's proposal implies that one would not analyze a merger
between General Motors and Ford in terms of its implications for an auto
market; rather, one would analyze first the merger's impact on the individual
markets for specific parts, like the engine, radiator, transmission, and headlights, and then attempt to determine how the complementary relationships
among these different components affect the stability of a hypothesized cartel
of auto assemblers.
This approach is both cumbersome and incorrect. Although these different components may be sold separately, it hardly seems likely that the threat
of consumers arranging for car assembly from individually purchased components would effectively constrain a new car assembly monopolist. Rather,
this monopolist would be constrained only by the entry of new firms performing the same sets of activities and producing a finished car.
This does not mean that the cluster approach to market definition is always appropriate. One can think of examples where consumer patronage of
a collection of single-service providers is sufficient to eliminate a hypothesized cluster market. For example, it has frequently been argued that banks
outpatient boundary. What has not been documented in great detail is how this affects the size
and composition of the inpatient service cluster and how this cluster can be expected to shrink
during the foreseeable future.
28. Baker, The Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Transformationof the Hos-

pital Industry, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 125 (1988).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 126-40.
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provide a unique cluster of services that differ sufficiently from those offered
by other financial institutions so as to render the cluster of banking services
as a separate antitrust market. 3 ' Without taking a position on whether this
market definition is correct for the purposes of evaluating banking mergers,
other financial institutions, such, as savings and loans, credit unions, savings
banks, and insurance companies, provide services that are close substitutes
for many of the services provided by commercial banks. One can easily envision customers shifting funds from bank demand deposits to savings and
loan NOW accounts in response to a reduction in the interest rates on demand deposits; seeking an automobile loan from a credit union in response
to an increase in bank car loan rates; or obtaining trust management services
from a trust company in response to an increase in trust management fees.
Hence, the convenience associated with "one-stop" banking may not give a
monopolist bank much opportunity to raise the price of any particular clus32
ter of services.
The situation may be quite different in the case of hospitals. A person
who purchases a hospital inpatient visit buys an array of services which individual service providers cannot easily acquire and combine. The patient care
process is "a sequence of spot demands and deliveries," which necessitates
that "production... be organized as if every input received by the patient is
potentially an absolute necessity." 33 For example, many patients will need
to combine postoperative nursing care with major surgical services. The
medical severity of many types of surgery simply requires that the hospital
locate certain types of labor (nurses, physicians, and technicians), as well as
capital (e.g., monitoring, diagnostic, and resuscitation equipment), close to
31.

See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).

32. Banks produce many other services in addition to the three mentioned above, and a
monopolist bank may indeed retain market power over them. For a more detailed discussion

of financial deregulation on product and geographic markets, see generally Langenfeld & McKenzie, FinancialDeregulation and GeographicMarket Delineation:An Application of the Jus-

tice Guidelines to Banking, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 695 (1985). The ability to unbundle a set of
services can be affected by regulatory, as well as technological, factors. Under one regulatory
regime, it may be sensible to speak of cluster markets, while under another it may not. This is
certainly true of banking, where regulatory changes exposed banks to new competition from

other service providers, and made unbundling less costly to consumers. Natural gas pipeline
markets are another example. Historically, natural gas pipelines only sold the joint product
"delivered gas," which consisted of gas and gas transmission bundled together. For antitrust
purposes, it made perfect sense to analyze the competitive impact of a pipeline merger in terms
of its implications for this cluster of complementary goods and services. Recent regulatory

changes, however, have made it possible for gas purchasers to unbundle this .cluster, i.e., to buy
gas directly from a producer and contract separately with a pipeline for its delivery. Consequently, there may now exist two separate antitrust markets where only one existed before.
33. Harris, The InternalOrganization of Hospitals: Some Economic Implications, 8 BELL
J.EcON. 467, 470 (1977).
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the patients to provide anticipated pre and postoperative care, as well as to
address any unanticipated complications and emergencies that may arise.
There is no practical way to supply these services to a patient outside of the
traditional inpatient setting; one cannot unbundle hospital services as one
can unbundle banking services. Regardless of whether these complementarities are characterized as a scope economy or as a "transactional complementarity,"3 4 they represent a reasonable basis for defining antitrust markets.3 5
The analysis in United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.36 demonstrates
how courts resolve the issue of inpatient versus outpatient care. The court
reasoned that the substitutability of inpatient and outpatient care occurs
over time as new technology and medical knowledge are acquired. 37 However, once a hospital can perform a procedure on an outpatient basis, cost
containment efforts ensure that the procedure is performed on that basis in
the future; it is performed as an inpatient procedure only when medically
necessary.8
The court also found that
there is direct competition between the individual outpatient services provided by hospitals and non-hospitals. Despite the presence
of this strain of competition, outpatient care is no substitute for
acute inpatient hospital care. The outpatient provider represents a
few procedures at most and cannot provide in any circumstance,
an Overnight stay. In providing patient care, the hospital may utilize a procedure that competes directly with outpatient providers
when used alone for an outpatient. However, all competition and
substitutability between the hospital and the outpatient provider
ends when that same outpatient procedure is used in tandem with
other services to treat an inpatient. The outpatient provider has
nothing comparable to offer.3 9
34. One commentator has used the term "transactional complementarities" to describe
situations where consumers can significantly reduce their transaction costs by purchasing a
bundle of goods from a single supplier. Note, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95
YALE L.J. 109, 116 (1985) (described as "a demand side analog to economies of scope").
Alternatively, these savings could simply be characterized as scope economies in product
distribution.
35. This is not to say that technological change could not cause the size of this cluster to
shrink over time. It is indeed the case that many surgical procedures that a generation ago
required a several day inpatient stay are now produced on an outpatient basis by both hospitals
and nonhospital providers. Nonetheless, a remaining core of inpatient services could potentially be monopolized.
36. 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, IllS.
Ct. 295 (1990).
37. Id. at 1259.
38. Id. at 1261.
39. Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
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b. Supply-Side Substitutes for Acute Care Hospitals
One of the potential constraints on the exercise of joint or unilateral market power is the existence of a competitive fringe that can readily increase
output. This fringe consists of those firms which do not participate in the
collusive agreement but which take the collusive price as given and set their
profit-maximizing level of output accordingly. If the fringe has a high supply elasticity, small price increases will produce relatively large increases in
output from these firms. These increases will, if sufficiently large, make
price increases unprofitable for the colluding firms.
In the specific context of a merger between short-term, general care hospitals, there are three sources of fringe supply. First, acute care hospitals may
exist which are not party to the collusive agreement. They may have excess
capacity and therefore may be likely to increase output in response to an
anticompetitive price increase. A second source of fringe supply is de novo
entrants; entry is discussed separately below. Finally, existing specialty care
hospitals, e.g., psychiatric, can modify their existing facilities and commence
production of acute care inpatient services.
The small number of specialty hospitals signifies that there will be only
rare instances when supply-side flexibility influences the determination of the
legality of a merger between general care institutions. However, instances
could arise in particular geographic markets when these specialized institutions control a significant quantity of total hospital capacity. Consequently,
the analysis should not ignore supply-side flexibility.
2. Geographic Market Analysis
To evaluate properly the market power that might be created through the
consolidation of a group of hospitals, one must consider all relevant demandand supply-side substitution possibilities. In the preceding section, the discussion centered on the constraints on market power imposed by nonhospital providers and specialty hospitals. Together, these constitute the
"product market" alternatives to the services produced by some hypothesized dominant firm or cartel. There is, however, another important dimension to hospital competition. A hospital merger could generate very high
levels of concentration in the geographic area that has been traditionally
served by the merging enterprises. The merged entity might nonetheless
have no market power, depending upon whether consumers residing in this
area perceive more distantly located hospitals as close substitutes for the
merged facility.' If they do, and if these alternative suppliers can readily
40. "Consumers" in this instance could consist of individuals, physicians acting as agents
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increase their supply (i.e., exhibit a sufficiently high supply elasticity), then
the ability of the merged enterprise to engage in anticompetitive activities
will be constrained.
The preceding paragraph describes the essence of the "geographic market
definition" question which forms perhaps the most important element in virtually all antitrust investigations of hospital mergers. In the remainder of
this section, this article discusses the conceptual approach to geographic
market delineation that is embodied in the 1984 Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines. It then analyzes and criticizes the methods that have
been historically used by the FTC and the DOJ to define the boundaries of
geographic markets.
a. Geographic Market Under the Merger Guidelines
The DOJ Guidelines' approach to the analysis of the geographic market
issue is conceptually the same as that used for the analysis of product market
issues. The Guidelines state that
the Department seeks to identify a geographic area such that a hypothetical firm that was the only present or future producer or
seller of the relevant product in that area could profitably impose a
"small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price. That
is, assuming that buyers could respond to a price increase within a
tentatively identified area only by shifting to firms located outside
the area, what would happen? If firms located elsewhere readily
could provide the relevant product to the hypothetical firm's buyers in sufficient quantity at a comparable price, an attempt to raise
price would not prove profitable, and the tentatively identified geographic area would prove to be too narrow.4 1
At issue here is the supply elasticity of the hospitals occupying the competitive fringe of the hypothesized market. As a general matter, the elasticity of fringe supply (i.e., the supply of services made available to consumers
residing inside the market by the firms located outside the market) will be a
function of the structure of the production and transportation costs of using
the outside producers, as well as other factors.4 2
In the case of hospital mergers, assessment of this fringe supply elasticity
is somewhat more complicated than it might be in markets for other goods
for patients, or health maintenance organizations or other groups who provide health care to
large numbers of members.
41. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 8.
42. These other factors are (1) the elasticity of the demand of the consumers located
"outside" the market and (2) the prevailing level of fringe supply, relative to the total volume
of output produced by the fringe suppliers. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 986-87 (1981); Scheffman & Spiller, supra note 20, at 131.
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and services because of the special relationship that exists between the patient, the physician, and the hospital. Traditionally, patients have not selected their hospitals directly. They selected their physicians and their
insurers, who, acting as agents for the patients, selected the hospital at which

the patient would receive treatment.4 3 This agency pattern implies that
choices by those other than the patient will determine the extent to which
fringe suppliers are chosen to provide services to consumers located inside
the market. While this does not change the general principle involved, it
makes the determination of fringe supply elasticity more difficult."
Although it is sometimes possible to delineate geographic markets directly

through the econometric estimation of residual demand curves,45 the FTC
and the DOJ have employed less formal geographic market definition tech-

niques in their hospital merger investigations. Both agencies have typically
relied upon the Elzinga-Hogarty test (E-H test) to establish the dimensions
43. See generally Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). To the extent that competition for physicians is
the primary dimension of hospital rivalry, the answer to the geographic market question will
turn on a number of factors. If patients are loyal to their physicians, and these physicians only
had admitting privileges at hospitals that are a party to the collusive agreement, then the
success of the cartel would depend on whether the physicians would seek (and obtain) privileges at more distant institutions in response to nonprice collusion. Whether this occurs will
depend upon physicians' willingness to incur the higher costs associated with the use of more
distant hospitals and the ability of these more distant institutions to absorb profitably the increased demand that would result from this behavior. By contrast, if price competition is
important, then it becomes necessary to assess factors such as (1) the extent of patient loyalty
to their current physicians (i.e., how large a price increase will patients absorb before they will
switch to a doctor having privileges at a lower-priced institution), (2) the willingness of patients to incur the costs of using more distant hospitals, and (3) (as before) the ability of these
alternative suppliers to serve these additional patients profitably.
44. For a discussion of the impact of physician and insurer purchasing preferences on the
determination of a geographic market for hospitals, see Zwanziger, Antitrust Considerations
and Hospital Markets, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 457 (1989).
45. See generally Baker & Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in ProductDifferentiatedIndustries, 33 J. INDUS. EON. 427 (1985) (examples of residual demand estimation); see also Scheffman & Spiller, supra note 20, at 133-34 (same). Data availability and
methodological requirements often limit the ability of researchers to obtain market definition
evidence via estimation of residual demand estimation techniques. It actually appears unlikely
that these techniques will be applicable to hospital market questions. Suppose that investigations hypothesize that the northern half of a large metropolitan area constitutes an antitrust
market for the purposes of a merger between two local hospitals. To estimate the residual
demand curve facing this group of hospitals, researchers would require historical data for some
period of time during which the costs (e.g., wages and factor prices) of the "northern half"
hospitals changed, while the costs of the "southern half" hospitals did not. We would expect
such data to be quite rare, since hospitals located in the same city are likely to face the same
input prices; increases or decreases in these costs will generally be experienced by all local
hospitals at roughly the same time. Without such data, however, the residual demand curve
cannot be identified.
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of the relevant geographic market.4 6 The E-H test uses two criteria to assess
whether some particular area should be characterized as a market for antitrust purposes: (1) the volume of services that are both locally produced and
consumed as a percentage of total local consumption and (2) the volume of
services that are both locally produced and consumed as a percentage of
total local production. These criteria have come to be known as the "LIFO"
(i.e., "little in from outside") and "LOFI" (i.e., "little out from inside") standards, respectively. Large values for the LIFO and LOFI statistics mean
that relatively little output is imported or exported from some particular
area. In order for some proposed market definition to satisfy the E-H test,
both the LIFO and the LOFI figures must meet or exceed some arbitrarily
defined threshold. It has become customary to say that a proposed market
passes a "strong" E-H test if both the LOFI and the LIFO statistics exceed
ninety percent, but that it passes only the "weak" E-H test if both figures fall
into the seventy-five to ninety percent range. It is doubtful that an area will
qualify as an antitrust "market" if either of these numbers falls below seventy-five percent. Large inflows or outflows of output suggest that it would
not be possible for producers in the area to establish and maintain collusive
prices successfully.4 7
In the case of hospital mergers, the E-H figures are typically constructed
from patient flow data, which give the locations of hospitals and residences
of their patients. These data are sometimes available from the hospitals
themselves or from state and local regulatory authorities. To illustrate the
application of the E-H methodology, suppose a merger is proposed between
two hospitals which compete in some hypothesized geographic market (market "A"). Following the protocol of the DOJ Guidelines, area A is believed
to be the smallest area in which supracompetitive prices potentially could be
established. Three items of information are then calculated for area A: (1)
the volume of hospital services that are both produced in area A and are
consumed by residents of area A; (2) the total volume of hospital services
consumed by residents of area A (i.e., wherever produced); and (3) the total
volume of services produced by hospitals in area A. The service volumes are
generally measured in terms of inpatient discharges or patient-days. The
ratio of (1) to (2) constitutes the LIFO statistic;4" the ratio of (1) to (3) is the
46. See Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineationin Antimerger
Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973).
47. Id. at 62-63.
48. A "high" LIFO statistic would indicate that few area A residents leave area A to

receive hospital services.
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LOFI statistic.4 9 If both numbers equal or exceed .90, the enforcement
agencies would likely declare area A to be a "strong" geographic market and
perform the other elements of a merger analysis (e.g., the calculation of concentration statistics, the evaluation of entry conditions) with respect to this
market. If market A does not pass the E-H test, the boundaries would be
expanded, and the E-H statistics would be recalculated. This process would
be repeated until an area is found that satisfies the E-H criteria.
Although the E-H method is widely used in hospital merger analyses,
many questions have been raised regarding its ability to identify conceptually correct antitrust markets.5 ° The E-H test is uninformative about the
demand and supply elasticities that are the ultimate determinants of market
boundaries and, therefore, of potential market power. The E-H test provides
a static picture of product or service flows; it neither reveals how this flow
would change in response to collusive prices nor reveals whether the changes
in these flows would be sufficient to offset a price increase.
In the specific case of hospital mergers, additional problems with the E-H
method may arise that further impair the ability of antitrust enforcers to
identify antitrust markets. One of these problems derives from the highly
aggregated nature of the patient flow data from which the E-H statistics are
constructed in many studies of hospital markets. 5 These data often distinguish only between broad categories of patient care. For example, one commonly used classification scheme separates patient discharges only into two
broad categories: short-term care discharges and long-term care discharges.
The problem is that, within a category such as "short-term patient discharges," there is a substantial amount of case-mix variation. This category
would include patients hospitalized for relatively simple surgical procedures
that are available from virtually any general short-term care facility, as well
as patients who are seeking extraordinarily complex procedures that require
highly specialized staff (and equipment) and which are provided only at a
relatively small number of "tertiary care" facilities. Even if the discharge
49. A "high" LOFI statistic would indicate that few residents of other areas come to area

A to obtain hospital services.
50. For a discussion of various approaches to geographic market definition and problems
with these approaches, see generally Dobson, Breen & Hurdle, GeographicMarket Definition:
A Review of Theory and Method for Domestic and InternationalMarkets, 14 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST

L. & ECON. 937 (1984). For a discussion focused on hospital markets in particular,

see generally Dranove & Shanley, A Note on the Relational Aspects of Hospital Market Definitions, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 473 (1989); Luft, Phibbs, Garnick & Robinson, Rejoinder to Dranove and Shanley, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 479 (1989); Werden, The Limited Relevance of Patient
Migration Data in Market Delineationfor Hospital Merger Cases, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 363
(1989); Zwanziger, supra note 44.
51. See Werden, supra note 50, at 363-66.
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data are categorized by particular specialties, such as medical-surgical, obstetrics, or psychiatric, a substantial amount of heterogeneity may nonetheless remain. An obstetric discharge may represent a routine pregnancy and
delivery that can be accommodated at any hospital with an OB/GYN unit,
or it may reflect a "high risk" pregnancy that calls for the use of an institution equipped to manage complex deliveries and their aftermath, e.g., hospitals having neonatal intensive care units.
Heterogeneity of this sort increases the difficulty of making reliable inferences on geographic market questions from aggregate discharge data. An
outflow of patients from some particular region might simply represent the
willingness of persons in that region to seek routine hospital care elsewhere,
which, using the E-H standard, argues against the proposed market definition and in favor of a more expansive definition. Alternatively, the data
might reflect persons seeking highly specialized care that is simply unavailable from the hospitals in their home community. 2 If the latter type of behavior accounts for most of the patient outflow, the appropriate geographic
market for antitrust analysis may, by implication, be at least as small as, and
perhaps smaller than, the proposed definition.5 3 An outflow of patients seeking specialty care cannot be construed as evidence of patients' ability to obtain primary care at hospitals located "outside" the market.54 The same
argument would of course apply to data on patient inflows, i.e., service outflows into a market. These patient flows might be the result of rural patients
traveling to an urban center to obtain particular types of treatment not provided by rural hospitals or rural physicians.55
Implicit in this argument is the proposition that some elements of the inpatient service cluster (the product market definition which was advocated
by complaint counsel in HospitalCorp. and Rockford Memorial) compete in
geographic markets that are larger in scope than those existing for other
elements of the cluster.5 6 This appears to be a reasonable conjecture; it ap52. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 468 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
53. Assuming, of course, that the LOFI standard is also satisfied.
54. That is, we cannot infer a high fringe supply elasticity of primary care services from
this outflow of patients.
55. In Hospital Corp., the Commission found that the Chattanooga urban area was the
relevant market in which to assess the proposed transaction, arguing that the flow of patients
into this area is, "with few exceptions, in need of specialized care and treatment unavailable in
their own communities." 106 F.T.C. at 468 (citations omitted). For a model of the patient
migration process that illustrates the problems involved in using patient flow data to calculate
E-H statistics without examining the reasons for those patient flows, see Werden, supra note

50.
56. The court in Rockford Memorial found that the existence of referral agreements between hospitals in outlying areas and the hospitals in question proved that patients travelled to
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pears likely that the market for highly specialized and esoteric services (e.g.,
organ transplants) might be regional, or perhaps national, while the market
7
for more routine procedures (e.g., cataract surgery) might be localized.'
b. Market Definition-Summary
Although the DOJ Merger Guidelines set forth a conceptually sound
methodology for delineating geographic market boundaries, the application
of this framework to hospital markets will probably continue to be a difficult
task. The data requirements for the empirical application of theoretically
defensible market identification techniques will seldom, if ever, be satisfied in
hospital markets. It therefore appears likely that enforcement agencies will
be constrained to rely on imperfect tools such as the Elzinga-Hogarty test for
assessing the geographic dimensions of competition. The E-H statistic is a
crude tool that can both understate and overstate market boundaries; consequently it must be used with a great deal of care and discretion. Investigators always must ask whether an absence of patient flows across some
boundary reflects the existence of a defensible antitrust market or instead
simply signifies that competitive prices prevailed on both sides of the boundary during the observation period. In cases where patient flows are significant, investigators must ask why those patient flows exist and whether they
reflect movements of patients for standard or specialized hospital care.
C. Entry Conditions
According to standard economic theory, socially optimal long-run market
the referral hospital for special treatment not available at their local hospital. "Furthermore, if
possible, the referring hospital will choose a hospital to refer a patient to with the understanding that the 'referring' hospital will not lose its primary and secondary patients to the 'referral'
hospital." United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1266 (N.D. Ill.
1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 295 (1990).

57. Although there unfortunately does not appear to be good data that would be instructive on this issue, some anecdotal evidence is available. Kralewski, Countryman, and Pitt
studied the HMO-hospital contracting process and found that, for primary and secondary
hospital services, HMOs weigh locational convenience at least as heavily as price when choosing a hospital. For tertiary care, however, they found that HMOs selected hospitals princi-

pally on price and quality, since
[p]atients requiring these services are much less concerned over convenience and are
much more amenable to being 'directed' to distant and even inconvenient sources of

care. HMOs cannot, therefore, be considered a unitary market from the hospitals'
perspective. Rather, there appears to be two separate markets--one for primary and

secondary care, and one for tertiary care. A third set of markets described by special
services such as obstetrics is also evident.
Kralewski, Countryman & Pitt, Hospitals and Health Maintenance OrganizationsFinancial
Agreements for Inpatient Services: A Case Study of the Minneapolis/St. Paul Area, 4 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV. 79, 83 (Summer 1983).
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performance requires that capital move freely in and out of industries. If it
does, then sustained anticompetitive behavior will not occur. Any attempt
by a dominant firm or cartel to earn monopoly rents through supracompetitive pricing or provision of subcompetitive quality will attract entry by
profit-seeking entrepreneurs. It will also create incentives for output expansion by rivals already in the industry. Left unchecked, this capacity expansion and price reduction will continue to occur until the dominant firm or
cartel dissipates its monopoly returns and a long-run, zero-profit equilibrium
has been restored.58
Do such conditions accurately characterize hospital markets in the United
States? Many observers believe that they do not. A principal reason for this
belief is the widespread existence of legal restrictions on investment and disinvestment in hospital capital. Numerous states require a regulatory authority, usually a state health planning agency, to approve proposed expansions
in hospital capital. 5 9 This regulatory approval, manifested in the issuance of
a "certificate of need" (CON), is dependent upon the regulator's perception
that the proposed expansion will satisfy some unmet "need" in the relevant
health care market.
It is immediately apparent that CON requirements, by design, may constitute an impediment to capital expansion, and therefore entry, into hospital
markets.' There is no assurance that even a well-intentioned regulator, ap58. When fixed costs are present, the market may only approximately attain this zero
profit condition because of the "integer problem." The integer problem arises when the
number of firms that would assure zero profits is not an integer (e.g., two and one-half firms).
In this case, only two firms would exist in equilibrium, since the addition of the third firm
would cause negative profits to be earned.
59. Until 1987, the federal government also sponsored a capital expenditure review
scheme under § 221 of the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat.
1329, 1386 (42 U.S.C. §§ 701, 1395, 1396, as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329,
1386 (adding § 1122 to Title XI of the Social Security Act)).
60. See Schramm & Renn, Hospital Mergers, Market Concentrationand the HerfindahlHirschmanIndex, 33 EMORY L.J. 869 (1984). Schramm and Renn argued that CON laws are
not true entry barriers because (I) most hospital markets contain excess capacity, which would
render entry unattractive to any "rational" firm, and (2) regulators invariably grant a CON
whenever a true "need" for a service or facility can be demonstrated. Schramm and Renn's
blanket assertion on the irrationality of entry into markets with excess capacity is untenable;
entry may or may not be deterred by excess capacity. Id. at 881; see, e.g., Gilbert, Pre-emptive
Competition, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 90 (J. Stiglitz & G. Matthewson eds. 1986). Schramm and Renn's second point is essentially an assertion
that CON .regulation works perfectly. In support of this contention, they cite to the selfproclaimed social efficiency of CON regulators. Schramm & Renn, supra, at 881. This proposition should be viewed skeptically. A regulator's notion of "need" does not necessarily bear
any resemblance to the concepts of demand and supply, which are the foundation of the socially efficient entry criterion in competitive markets. Further, certain aspects of the political
economy of CON regulation (in particular, the standing granted to incumbents to oppose entry
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plying the politically determined "need" criteria, will make entry decisions
that are consistent with the attainment of the socially optimal price and
quality mix, which would be ensured by competition. The very real possibility exists that by raising entry costs, CON requirements will insulate incumbent providers from the disciplining effects of potential entry and thereby
permit a dominant firm or cartel to earn supracompetitive returns even in
the long run.
Antitrust enforcers often examine factors other than CON regulations
when assessing entry conditions in hospital merger cases. These factors include: (1) construction and planning lead times required to establish a new
hospital; (2) the need to incur sunk costs upon entry; and (3) scale economies. 61 These factors are sometimes referred to as "entry barriers," though
they need not always satisfy an economist's formal definition of an entry
barrier.6 2
The first of these factors, lead time, does not qualify as an entry barrier
under any formal definition, but it is nonetheless an important consideration
in merger enforcement policy. Subsequent to a merger, entry may restore
long-run competitive equilibrium in an industry. However, if this entry
takes a long time to occur (e.g., five years), and if anticompetitive behavior is
likely to occur in the meantime, then intervention may be justified to prevent
the accompanying welfare losses. Economic theory unfortunately does not
give clear guidance on what time period is appropriate for evaluating
whether entry is sufficiently rapid to eliminate anticompetitive concerns.
The DOJ Merger Guidelines employ a two-year time horizon (i.e., entry that
is expected to occur within two years of the price increase will be regarded as
an important competitive constraint on monopoly pricing). 63 This figure apapplications) are particularly troublesome from an antitrust perspective. The FTC noted in
Hospital Corp. that "the CON process provides existing hospitals ... ample opportunity to
significantly forestall the entry of a new hospital or the expansion of an existing hospital within
the area." 106 F.T.C. 361, 492 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1038 (1987). Similarly, "the CON law grants a hospital already within the market a
decided cost advantage by burdening an entrant with delays, expenses, and uncertainties never

shouldered by existing competitors." United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp.
1251, 1282 (N.D. Il1. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990).

For a discussion of regulatory barriers to entry and their effects, see generally Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47 (1982).
61. See W.T. Winslow, Deputy Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Remarks Before the 36th Annual American Bar Association Antitrust Spring Meeting
(Mar. 22, 1988); Baker, supra note 28, at 154.
62. An entry barrier is "a cost of producing which must be borne by a firm which seeks to
enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry and which implies a distortion in the allocation of resources from a social point of view." von Weizsacker, A Welfare
Analysis of Barriersto Entry, II BELL J. ECON. 399, 400 (1980).
63. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 18.
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pears to have been arbitrarily selected, and there is no necessary reason for
believing that a longer or shorter period is not consistent with reasonable
competitive goals.
The interpretation of the role of scale economies in affecting entry has
evolved considerably over time. Since the modem view of scale economies
as an entry barrier is closely tied to the notion of sunk costs, this article will
discuss them jointly. Scale economies are reductions in unit production
costs that typically arise from spreading fixed costs over greater volumes of
output. For example, operating a modem 250 bed hospital may require the
acquisition of a certain number of pieces of different types of diagnostic
equipment (e.g., lab and X-ray machines, computer terminals). Doubling
the size of the hospital to 500 beds will require the addition of more machines, but it may not entail a doubling of their number. If this is true, then
scale economies will be present, ignoring other cost implications of
expansion.
In this example, the cost of this equipment is fixed; however, it need not be
sunk. Sunk costs are the costs associated with irreversible, or market-specific, investments. If the owner of a hospital elects to exit the business, some
or all of the costs of this equipment may be recoverable. Data processing
equipment, for example, could be sold to persons in a wide variety of different industries. Laboratory and X-ray equipment is obviously more specialized to health care applications, but it is not specific to particular geographic
markets. If such equipment can be sold to hospitals in other geographic
markets, then its costs need not be sunk either. These fixed costs are symmetric in the sense that they must be incurred by both incumbents and entrants. Fixed costs can be sunk, of course; for example, construction of a
hospital may require the installation of a building whose specialized physical
features have no value in other uses. The cost of these features is sunk.
The important distinction between costs that are sunk and those that are
fixed is that only the former can create entry barriers in any meaningful
welfare sense. If all investments are reversible, then entrants suffer no disadvantage relative to incumbents, irrespective of any production cost advantages attributable to scale." This is because the entrant can attempt to
compete on the same scale as the incumbent without incurring differential
risk. If the attempt to enter proves unprofitable, the entrant can exit without
further penalty.
64. See W. BAUMOL, J. PANZER & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 279-303 (1982) (Chapter Ten: Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry
Barriers, Public Goods, and Sustainability of Monopoly) [hereinafter CONTESTABLE
MARKETS].
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Sunk costs may create an entry barrier because they create a differential
degree of risk between the incumbent, who has already committed resources
to the industry, and the entrant, who must take fungible capital and irreversibly commit part (or all) of it to a particular activity. 65 Although the incumbent also confronted risk when he entered the market, the entrant might face
additional risk, in part because of actions taken by the incumbent to increase
the entrant's risk.66 The entrant must be compensated for this added risk in
the sense that expected profits received when entry is successful equal or
exceed the sunk costs incurred when it is not. The additional amount of
money that an entrant must receive to induce him to incur this incremental
risk represents a potential entry barrier.6 7 It is this amount, rather than the
size of the sunk cost per se, that represents the size of the potential barrier.
Viewing entry barriers as deriving from the risk premia necessary to induce firms to incur sunk costs also yields some interesting insights into
means by which these entry barriers can be reduced. Firms will obviously
require less compensation when the likelihood lessens that entry will fail and
the sunk cost penalty will be incurred. As Baumol observed, the ability to
execute contracts at the time entry is undertaken reduces this risk.68 In the
context of hospital markets, the ability of an entrant to sign a contract with
PPOs, HMOs, or large employer groups to assure a steady and predictable
flow of business will reduce the magnitude of the entry barrier associated
with any given sunk investment. Also, the ability to reverse capital investments upon exit reduces the magnitude of sunk costs, thereby reducing entry
barriers.
D.

Efficiencies

In general, consolidation of hospital operations, as with any acquisition,
may produce efficiencies that could outweigh possible anticompetitive effects
of the acquisition. The relevant efficiencies that balance the possible an65. Id. at 290-92.
66. Risk is a social cost for which entrants must be compensated, and thus need not constitute an entry barrier (in the welfare sense). It is conceivable, however, that incumbents can
take strategic actions to increase the degree of risk confronted by an entrant, thereby deterring
welfare-increasing entry. Incumbents may, for example, be able to persuade entrants that the
incumbents' post-entry levels of output will make entry unprofitable. Since entrants' expectations about post-entry behavior might depend in part on the existing market structure, it is
possible that current potential entrants might expect a different response (and thus require a
larger risk premium) than did current incumbents when the latter faced the entry decision,
even if size of the sunk investment necessary for entry does not change.
67. CONTESTABLE MARKETS, supra note 64, at 282 ("An entry barrier is anything thatr
requires an expenditure by a new entrant into an industry, but imposes no equivalent cost upon
an incumbent.").
68. Id. at 291.

1991]

Economic Analysis In Health Care Antitrust

ticompetitive effects of an acquisition should be those which are not available
through less problematic means. For example, some commonly cited efficiencies include reductions in administrative and overhead costs. These cost
reductions might be available through a conglomerate merger with no horizontal overlap, and therefore the acquisition, with possible anticompetitive
consequences, is not necessary to achieve them.6 9
Beyond the question of whether efficiencies exist, there is the additional
screen of whether they will be passed on to consumers as a result of the
acquisition. While most economists would argue that the proper standard
for antitrust enforcement would maximize the sum of the gains to producers
and the gains to consumers, if cost reductions will not be passed on to consumers in the form of lower quality-adjusted prices, the Commission is likely
to challenge an acquisition.
Efficiencies available only through horizontal acquisitions can include
both economies of scale and of scope. Economies of scale are found when
unit costs of production decline as the level of output is increased. Economies of scope are generated when inputs are used jointly in multiple outputs,
as for example in physician services, such that the cost of producing multiple
outputs jointly is less than the cost of producing them separately.
1. Economies of Scale
A recent review of the literature on hospital cost function estimation7'
found that most analyses characterize production of hospital services as having constant returns to scale or constant unit cost with increasing output
once a threshold of approximately 200 beds is reached.7 1 Thus, most of
these studies indicate that hospitals below this size prior to the acquisition
are not capable of producing hospital services with maximum efficiency. In
69. The Merger Guidelines appear to take a broader definition of merger specific efficiencies by including at least some overhead cost savings.
Cognizable efficiencies include, but are not limited to, achieving economies of scale,
better integration of production facilities, plant specialization, lower transportation
costs, and similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms. The Department may also consider claimed
efficiencies resulting from reductions in general selling, administrative, and overhead
expenses, or that otherwise do not relate to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms ....
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 22. However, "the Department will reject claims of
efficiencies if equivalent or comparable savings can reasonably be achieved by the parties
through other means." Id.
70. Cowing, Holtmann & Powers, Hospital Cost Analysis.: A Survey and Evaluation of
Recent Studies, in 4 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH
257 (R. Scheffier ed. 1983).
71. Id. at 264.
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particular, Grannemann 72 found evidence of strong economies of scale in the
production of emergency room services, and most studies which disaggregate hospital output find that average costs decrease at least up to some
point with increases in unit output and bed utilization. This would imply
that a consolidation of the overlapping departments of the two hospitals
might produce significant efficiencies due to the presence of scale economies
in production.7 3
Another method of evaluating scale economies in production is via survivor analysis. This type of analysis is based on the premise that the most
efficiently sized firms will tend, over time, to survive in a market while inefficiently large or small firms will tend to move toward efficient size or exit
the market. That is, if some sizes of hospitals are more efficient than others,
then hospital decisionmakers will attempt to alter the size of their hospital to
take advantage of these efficiencies and maximize some utility function.
Over time, the size distribution of hospitals will tend toward an optimum
where all sizes are equally efficient at the margin. Until this optimum is
reached, those sizes that grow most rapidly can be identified as most efficient
at the margin. Conversely, those sizes that are decreasing most rapidly can
be identified as least efficient at the margin.
Carson Bays analyzed changes in the size distribution of hospitals over
time.74 Using the survivor analysis technique, he found that from 1971 to
1977, there was a statistically significant decline in the percentage of hospitals with less than 100 beds. 75 This was true whether the group was all
hospitals or if the analysis was limited to either for-profit or not-for-profit
hospitals. Using the same technique with 1976, 1981, and 1987 American
Hospital Association data,7 6 similar results were compiled in the following
table:
72. Grannemann, supra note 26, at 121.
73. However, this approach implicitly assumes the absence of cost complementarities be-

tween different hospital outputs, whereas if there are scope economies between different departments, shutting down a department in a hospital could raise the costs of producing some
or all of the remaining services.
74. Bays, The Determinants of HospitalSize: A Survivor Analysis, 18 APPLIED ECON. 359
(1986).

75. Id. at 362.
76. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS (1977, 1982 & 1988
eds.).
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PERCENTAGE OF HOSPITALS WITH 100 OR FEWER BEDS

For-Profit
Nonprofit
All Hospitals

1976
57%
48%
49%

1981
49%
46%
46%

(1976-1987)
1987
44%
46%
46%

The most marked decrease in any size class was in for-profit hospitals with
less than fifty beds. The 1976-1987 time period also saw statistically
significant increases in the percentage of hospitals with 200-399 beds. This
tends to confirm Bays's conclusion that "the emerging consensus of these
recent studies is that average cost per admission is minimized over the
approximate range of 200-400 beds.""" H.E. Frech prepared a survivor
analysis for the period 1970-1985 and obtained similar results concerning
market share.78 Frech also found that small hospitals (fewer than 100 beds)
experienced larger declines in both occupancy rates and profitability relative
to large hospitals.79
It is noteworthy that recent DOJ antitrust enforcement activity has
focused primarily on acquisitions in which all substantial efficiencies due to
scale economies were probably already achieved by the pre-merger firms.
Two recent DOJ cases involving nonprofit organizations dealt with much
larger hospitals than are analyzed here. One proposed acquisition involved a
310 bed and a 683 bed hospital in Roanoke, Virginia, and the other involved
a 363 bed and a 396 bed hospital in Rockford, Illinois. Neither of these
transactions, both of which the Department of Justice challenged, would be
expected to produce substantial scale economies if the literature on hospital
scale economies is correct.
In contrast, cases that the Justice Department has declined to pursue
include a case in Danville, Illinois, in which the merging hospitals had 235
and 219 beds and were both operating substantially below fifty percent of
capacity, and a case in Portsmouth, Ohio, involving a 225 bed and a 210 bed
hospital, one of which was arguably failing. Neither of these acquisitions
was opposed by area residents. In Danville, the Justice Department was
,'convinced that there were genuine efficiencies that could be obtained only
by the merger and its ensuing consolidation." 80° Similarly, in Portsmouth,
77. Bays, supra note 74, at 359.
78. See H.E. Frech, An Economic Analysis of the Proposed Merger of Sacred Heart
Hospital and the Eugene Hospital (submitted to the U.S. Dep't of Justice 1988).
79. Frech conducted two analyses: one using aggregated national data and one using data
on Oregon hospitals. There may be additional regional variation in survival rates not detected
by Frech's analysis.
80. C.F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
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the parties to the transaction argued that the "diminution of competition
occurring from the merger would be offset by efficiencies achieved by the
consolidation of the facilities."'" Based on an evaluation of the facts, the
Justice Department decided against a suit. The existence of potential scalerelated efficiencies, however, does not mean that the acquisition will not be
challenged. The FTC has challenged a merger between two hospitals in
Ukiah, California, both having approximately 50 beds.8 2
2. Economies of Scope
The economics literature has identified varying results on economies of
scope in production of hospital outputs. At least three studies8" have found
some scope diseconomies. However, one study found substantial cost savings associated with joint production of several outputs, such as pediatrics,
obstetrics, and emergency room services.84 The evidence on economies of
scope is mixed and probably should not be used to indicate strong support
for an acquisition. However, there is some indication that cost savings may
be available from scope economies.
3. Efficiencies-Conclusion
Given the evidence on efficiencies available from hospital acquisitions, it
may be the case that many mergers between competing hospitals are efficient. However, when such a transaction also creates a substantial likelihood of competitive harm, the merger should then be "reasonably necessary
to achieve significant net efficiencies,"" 5 and the parties should show that the
merger is likely to achieve such efficiencies. Finally, the efficiencies achieved
from the merger should outweigh the projected anticompetitive consequences of the acquisition.8 6
Justice, Remarks on Antitrust Enforcement and Hospital Mergers: Safeguarding Emerging
Price Competition 21 (Jan. 21, 1988).
81. Id. at 22.
82. Adventist Health System/West, No. 89-9234 (F.T.C. filed Nov. 7, 1989), complaint
dismissed (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 1990) (appeal pending before the Commission).
83. See, e.g., Cowing & Holtmann, supra note 26; Grannemann, supra note 26; Sherman,
supra note 19.
84. Fournier & Mitchell, The Impact of Competitionfor HospitalServices: A Multiproduct
Cost Analysis (Nov. 1987) (unpublished manuscript).
85. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 22. For a discussion of the trade-offs between
efficiencies and market power, see generally Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense:
The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
86. The court in Rockford gave the following account of its required standard:
Although the defendants have demonstrated that the merger will generate some
unique savings ....
the amount saved pales in comparison to the likely amount of
revenues generated by the defendants in the same five year period. Moreover, mo-
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E. Conclusion
A major task in assessing the competitive implications of hospital mergers
is defining the dimensions of the product and the geographic markets within
which competition takes place. This task is particularly difficult in the case
of hospital mergers because of the heterogeneous nature of hospitals' output
mix, the rapid pace of technological change in health service markets, and
the empirical inability to implement conceptually sound market definition
techniques. Nonetheless, the merger analysis framework articulated in the
DOJ Merger Guidelines can be applied fruitfully to hospital mergers.
An increase in the level of concentration in an economically relevant market is not a sufficient condition for the exercise of market power. Barriers to
entry, such as those created by government regulations, must also be present. Although barriers of this sort are gradually being eliminated, many jurisdictions still adhere to regulatory policies that inhibit and impede
competition. Efficiencies may also be present which may offset possible anticompetitive impacts of the acquisition.
Unless a merger appears to create a monopolist or dominant firm, assessing market boundaries and identifying impediments to entry into those markets is only part of the task that must be undertaken by antitrust enforcers.
In most common oligopoly market settings, enforcers must also attempt to
predict if rival firms can establish and maintain an explicit or tacit anticompetitive agreement.
II.

ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS AMONG COMPETITORS

Agreements among competitors that are short of a merger can harm competition. Price-fixing, for example, harms consumers by directly restricting
price competition between otherwise competing entities. However, agreements on other dimensions of competition can harm consumers without
price-fixing. Also, some agreements among competitors restrict output and
raise prices without providing any offsetting consumer benefits, while others
can lead to greater efficiencies. At one extreme, Congress has given certain
agreements among competitors, such as motor carrier rate bureaus, per se
legality.8 7 At the other extreme, it is per se illegal to fix prices, divide marnopoly rents could far outweigh the savings presented, particularly in light of the fact
that much of the savings cited by the defendants were not clearly and convincingly
generated by the merger.
United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd,
898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990).
87. Reed-Bulwinkle Act, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 10706(b) (spec. supp. 1990)). The Interstate Commerce Commission has since limited collective rate setting and other aspects of tariff bureaus' ability to restrict actions of their mem-
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kets, and organize boycotts in most markets not exempt from antitrust
laws. 88 A continuum of possible agreements among rivals, including trade
association rules and some joint ventures, exists between these two extremes.
Antitrust enforcement officials must analyze possible agreements among rivals and separate those arrangements that are likely to produce efficiency
benefits from those that harm consumers.
A.

Alternative Legal Standardsfor Agreements Among Competitors

The competing per se and rule of reason standards force courts to make a
trade-off among judicial efficiency, business certainty, and accuracy in decisions.8 9 A per se standard provides clear guidance to businesses and
promises judicial efficiency. Per se bans on agreements tend to favor those
who would challenge such agreements because a plaintiff need not devote as
much time and energy to bringing a case as under a rule of reason inquiry.
Moreover, if a plaintiff can successfully characterize a restriction as per se
illegal, he will usually win. Alternatively, while a court can make a full rule
of reason analysis in all horizontal agreements cases, it is very cumbersome.
There is usually a gain in the accuracy of the decisionmaking process by
devoting resources to weighing the potential anticompetitive costs against
the benefits of an agreement, but this often takes a great deal of time and
expense. Such a process creates uncertainty in the business community that
inhibits planning and thus discourages some agreements. Despite this tendency, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof in rule of reason cases. As
such, rule of reason tends to favor defendants.
With respect to health care, the Commission has generally found group
boycotts to be per se illegal.' Other cases have been less easy to identify as
per se illegal. For example, the consent signed in MedicalStaff of Memorial
Medical Center9 provides that the medical staff will not deny or restrict

hospital privileges to certified nurse-midwives unless the staff has a reasonable basis for believing that the restriction would serve the interests of the
hospital in providing "for the efficient and competent delivery of health care
bers. See Notification of Rate Proposals Following Prior Independent Action, 358 I.C.C. 487
(1978).
88. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n., No. 88-1198 (F.T.C.
Jan. 22, 1990).
89. For a discussion of the trade off between simple and complex legal rules in antitrust,
see Fisher, Johnson & Lande, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 777
(1989).
90. Examples of group boycotts found to be illegal include Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 101
F.T.C. 57 (1983), rev'd, 745 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Rochester
Anesthesiologists, 110 F.T.C. 175 (1988).
91. 110 F.T.C. 541 (1988).
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services." 9 2 The Commission has also investigated restraints against advertising and other forms of solicitation, restraints on innovation and new entry, restrictions on access to hospitals, and illegal tying arrangements.
Agreements such as advertising restrictions, hours of service limitations, and
ancillary agreements to joint ventures constitute gray areas in judicial deci-

sionmaking, where the law currently makes an uncomfortable transition
from per se rules against agreements among competitors to rule of reason
analysis.
The Supreme Court has realized the difficulty of this transition in cases
such as Broadcast Music, Inc.,93 National Collegiate Athletic Association,94
and Indiana Federation of Dentists,95 and has attempted to put some struc-

ture in the analysis of these "gray area" agreements. As the leader in challenging these noncriminal agreements in cases such as American Medical
Association,9 6 Indiana Federation of Dentists, and Massachusetts Board of
Registrationin Optometry,97 the FTC has attempted to flesh out a reasonable
approach based on an "expanded per se inquiry" or a "truncated rule of
reason" approach to the "gray area" cases.
Even when a rule of reason standard would judge the legality of the basic
agreement, the FTC and the courts may challenge specific rules as per se
illegal or pursue them under a MassachusettsBoard truncated rule of reason
approach. Specifically, the majority of the Commission recently declined to
challenge a joint venture agreement, but it did find certain ancillary clauses

anticompetitive. 9" A joint venture between, for example, two or more
HMOs to provide some service to their members would be analyzed by a.
92. Memorial Medical Center, 110 F.T.C. at 546.
93. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
94. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
95. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
96. American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1005 (1979), aff'd, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.
1980), aff'd by an equally divided Court 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
97. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988).
98. In Nippon Sheet Glass, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,256 (F.T.C. 1990) (proposed Mar. 27, 1990),
Nippon proposed purchasing 20% of Libby-Owens-Ford (LOF), a domestic subsidiary wholly
owned by Pilkington Brothers, plc. The stock purchase, along with other terms, effectively
made LOF a joint venture between Nippon and Pilkington. The stock acquisition, as with all
mergers and acquisitions, was analyzed under a rule of reason analysis with close attention
paid to factors such as market definition and entry conditions. By not challenging the stock
acquisition, the majority of the Commission indicated that it did not have reason to believe the
joint venture was anticompetitive. The Commission did, however, prohibit one clause in the
joint venture agreement, which prevented Nippon and Pilkington from independently building
a plant in the United States, This clause would have effectively forced each party to commit
fully to the joint venture by preventing the opportunistic behavior of expanding capacity
outside of the venture. Although the restriction in question would have arguably encouraged
the parent companies to channel their competitive efforts through the joint venture, all five
Commissioners voted to rescind the clause.
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rule of reason. However, an ancillary clause to prevent competition between
the HMOs in the provision of other services might be analyzed as inherently
suspect.
B.

The Economics of Agreements Among Competitors

The potential for collusive horizontal agreements on output and prices is
always present among competitors. However, collusive behavior is not limited to prices, market division, and boycotts. Competitors may employ horizontal agreements to disadvantage firms outside the group anticompetitively
and to prevent innovative practices of nonparticipating firms. For example,
in Massachusetts Board, one of the challenged restraints was a "ban on
truthful advertising of an affiliation between an optometrist and a retail optical store." 9 9 Not only did the ban on advertising make entry by retail optical chains more difficult, it most likely raised the costs of obtaining
customers for the optometrists willing to form such an affiliation. Therefore,
the restraint probably raised the overall cost of such an affiliation and raised
the profits of nonaffiliated optometrists.
Competitors also may use horizontal agreements to raise their own costs
by adopting rules that make certain forms of competition costly for all participants. For example, many consumers search the prices of different firms
for the lowest quality-adjusted price of a desired product or service. Restrictions on advertising, services, and hours of operation clearly increase the
cost of obtaining information on the lowest price. Consumers are then faced
with a tradeoff: they must either spend more time and money searching for a
lower quality-adjusted price supplier or cut their search short when the restriction-induced increase in search costs more than offsets the increased
likelihood of finding a lower price. This leads some consumers to pay higher
prices for the desired product or service, while 'others stop their search
before they find a price low enough to induce them to buy, thus reducing
demand for output.
Agreements among rival firms or doctors may also produce significant
economic benefits. These agreements may generate large efficiencies through
the integration of facilities in research and development, production, marketing, information gathering, and quality assurance. Moreover, these
agreements correct "externalities" that could otherwise lead to market failures." In the professions, ethical codes can prevent negative externalities
stemming from deceptive advertisements. Advertisements such as "painless
99. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 585 (1988).
100. An externality exists when the actions of a firm or an individual indirectly affect the
well-being of other firms or individuals.
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dentist" may bring customers to the advertising dentist, but if the dentist is
not "painless," his clients not only may never return to him but also may be
reluctant to use any dentist. Ethical codes also can create positive externalities, such as assuring consumers that any member of an association meets
certain minimum quality standards.
Under what conditions might the potential for collusion outweigh the benefits from such horizontal agreements? Economic analysis identifies several
necessary conditions. First, those involved in the agreement must collectively possess some form of "market power." In some cases, market power
may arise from the large market share controlled by participants or the presence of significant barriers to entry or expansion into the relevant market. In
other cases, participants in an agreement may achieve market power relative
to nonparticipants if participants achieve cost savings that cannot be duplicated outside of the agreement. Impediments to entry into the group or profession need not be significant; it is enough that it is difficult for alternative
groups to achieve economies of scale or other cost advantages enjoyed by
members of the group, association, or medical staff.101
Second, the participants must be able to impose costs on, or deny benefits
to, nonparticipants. In other words, the agreement must be enforceable,
often through coercive state power.
Third, the same efficiency benefits which the horizontal agreement generates may be obtained through a less restrictive alternative with little potential for anticompetitive effects. Finally, as Demsetz hypothesizes, other
unrestricted aspects of competition, which competitors can substitute inex10 2
pensively for those restricted, must not exist.
While these conditions may be necessary for an agreement to be anticompetitive, they are not sufficient. Most organizations and joint ventures are, in
essence, collections of agreements not to compete in a variety of dimensions.
It is extremely difficult to separate, either analytically or empirically, the
procompetitive agreements from the anticompetitive ones. Many organizations and joint ventures have aspects of both. However, most joint ventures
and associations or medical staff rules are, on balance, procompetitive.
Thus, it is critical that law enforcement actions not destroy the basic proconsumer, efficiency aspects of the association, medical staff, or joint venture.
For example, if an association or joint venture grew from a small market
share to dominate a whole market over competition from others, then that
101. For further discussion on agreements among competitors, see Langenfeld & Morris,
Analyzing Agreements Among Competitors: What Does the Future Hold?, ANTITRUST BULL.
(forthcoming).
102. H. Demsetz, One Hundred Years of Antitrust: Should We Celebrate?, The Brent Upson Memorial Lecture, George Mason University (Sept. 1989).
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association or joint venture must have been more efficient (and serviceable to
consumers) than its alternatives. The growth of the American Medical Association is a case in point: "[P]rivate practitioners flocked to join the AMA
during the Progressive Era. From 8,400 member doctors in 1900, the AMA
jumped to 70,000 by 1910 and represented fully 60 percent of the nation's
doctors by 1920."' 103 This does not mean that all of an association's rules are
efficiency driven; rather, the overall set of rules produces an alternative that
consumers preferred.
Assuming the association or joint venture eventually dominates a market,
can antitrust enforcers identify rules that unnecessarily limit competition,
while leaving alone the rules that are efficiency motivated? Is there a method
for accomplishing this short of rule of reason, which often generates substantial legal costs and uncertainty for firms?
C. The Need for a More Simple Framework to Analyze Agreements
Among Competitors
All horizontal agreements among rivals may limit competition. Therefore, some argue horizontal agreements in general may be unnecessarily restrictive, primarily because individual firms could achieve the same ends
without potential antitrust problems by negotiating separate agreements
with each of their customers and competitors to achieve the efficiencies.
This rationale, however, does not help policy makers determine which joint
ventures, medical staff rules, or other agreements are anticompetitive. Most
economists, of course, would prefer that all antitrust enforcement agencies
conduct a full rule of reason analysis by balancing costs and benefits before
challenging horizontal restraints. However, it is extremely costly to gather
and analyze all of the economic information required under the rule of reason. Moreover, some information necessary for a full rule of reason analysis
may not be critical in determining whether to challenge restraints in most
cases. These considerations, coupled with the limited resources available to
antitrust enforcement agencies, suggest that it does not make sense for the
courts and antitrust enforcement agencies to perform a full rule of reason
analysis in every case.
Judge Frank Easterbrook advocates an approach to analyzing agreements
among competitors that uses market power as the appropriate screen. "
Determining the market power of an association is, however, more difficult
103.
ing the
Rosner
104.

Markowitz & Rosner, Doctors in Crisis.-MedicalEducation and Medical Reform DurProgressive Era, 1895-1915, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 188 (S. Reverby & D.
eds. 1979).
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
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than in most product markets. First, there are the normal tasks of market
definition and entry.' 0 5 Second, several techniques used to define markets
and market power in merger cases may not be useful in evaluating agreements among competitors." Third, while market power may take several
forms when dealing with an association, an association may not need an
extremely large market share to generate anticompetitive rents. Depending
on the profession, some rules may limit competition within an association
and increase prices of its members without regard to nonmembers, while in
other professions, nonmembers may limit the ability of an association to
adopt anticompetitive rules. Anecdotal evidence can give an impression of
whether market power exists in a horizontal restraints case. However, going
beyond the anecdotal level to determine market power systematically may
quickly require an analysis that approaches the complexity of a full rule of
reason analysis.

07

A market power screen must be used in cases where a group of competitors is alleged to have monopolized the market for an input into the production of some good or service.108 Hospital privilege cases may fall into this
category. If, as in Memorial Medical Center,"°9 health care providers are
denied hospital privileges by a group of other health care providers, this may
increase their costs of doing business substantially to the extent that they
cannot practice profitably at all if there are no close substitutes for the monopolized input." 0 In Memorial Medical Center, for example, the obstetri105. Even if one chooses to assume entry into a profession is difficult, one must define the
product market with care because it is virtually impossible to identify market power without
knowing the proper antitrust market.
106. For example, premerger prices are usually competitive and the main concern is that
prices could increase due to the merger. Accordingly, the Department of Justice's Merger
Guidelines define markets in terms of the potential for price increases from observed levels. In
existing agreements among competitors that involve possibly anticompetitive restrictions, observed prices may have already been raised to monopoly levels. Consequently, applying DOJ
style analyses may lead to relevant product and geographic markets that are too large-understating the market power of the firms involved in the agreement.
107. For a list of the types of nonsystematic anecdotal evidence that might be used in
horizontal restraints cases, see infra note 121.
108. Using a market power screen, those competitors who, as a group, do not have market
power would not be prohibited from undertaking joint activity. See also THE DICTIONARY OF
MODERN ECONOMICS 274 (D. Pearce ed. 1983).
109. Medical Staff of Memorial Medical Center, 110 F.T.C. 541 (1988).
110. Market power for a monopolized input is determined by the price elasticity of demand
for that input. The determinants of this elasticity are (1) the extent to which other inputs may
be substituted, (2) the elasticity of demand for the final product, (3) the proportion of total
product cost attributable to the input in question, and (4) the elasticity of supply of other
inputs. See G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 242-44 (3d ed. 1966). If there are good
substitutes for the "monopolized" input, the monopolist will have little meaningful market
power.
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cal and gynecological staff agreed to deny hospital privileges to a certified
nurse-midwife."' Essentially, they colluded to create and exercise market
power in the market for an input--obstetric services produced at a local
hospital." 2 This had anticompetitive consequences, and a consent order
was obtained. In these cases, denial of privileges or access is not likely to
have anticompetitive consequences unless control of the facility in question
confers market power on those who control access to it through their collective actions, which eliminates potential competitors not party to the agree3
ment by denying these entrants access to "essential" or low cost facilities. 1
In general, an association, medical staff, or joint venture either must offer
some advantage to members or be able to force its rules on nonmembers in
order to restrict output and raise price. Otherwise, nonmembers can take
sales away from association members when the association tries to maintain
higher prices. There must be some impediment to an alternative organization recreating the efficiencies of the association. These impediments might
include: (1)explicit legal restrictions on other associations or (2) the need for
an association to achieve a minimum membership representing a significant
percentage of providers before it can offer efficient services. Without such an
impediment, another association could be formed that offers the same efficiencies and lower prices to final consumers, thereby eroding the base of
associations that attempt to raise price above the competitive level. Finally,
the association must have some way to punish its members if they do not
abide by the association's rules. Lacking some enforcement mechanism,
members would reap the benefits of the organization and be able to cheat on
anticompetitive restrictions to gain additional clients--effectively destroying
attempts by the association to restrict quality-adjusted output and raise
prices.
111. 110 F.T.C. at 544.
112. Id. at 542.

113. Creating and exercising monopoly power in an input market injures competition and
reduces consumer welfare. Once this power has been created, however, economic theory can-

not tell us whether a decision to sell only to some subset of the purchasers of this input (i.e.,
excluding others) further reduces welfare or whether it mitigates the monopoly welfare losses.
See Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals" Costs, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 95 (1988). One
might be able to make a credible argument that in medical privileges cases, such exclusionary

conduct further reduces welfare. In many input markets, a vertically integrated upstream monopolist might be willing to sell to downstream entrants, as it could set a price for the input
that attenuates the competitive significance of the entrant. In privileges cases, the health pro-

fessional is usually not charged a per-patient price for admissions; once granted admission
privileges, the professional has substantial discretion as to the number of patients admitted.
Unless the hospital charges the patients of the targeted professionals a higher price than it
charges the patients of the collusive group, outright denial of privileges may be necessary to
effectively exercise input market power.
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As a policy matter, while the Commission staff often considers market
power in case selection, competent analysis of market power almost inevitably leads to a full rule of reason analysis or to a set of filters unlikely ever to
find a practice illegal." 4 Massachusetts Board illustrates that the Commission understands the difficulty of analyzing market power in agreements
among competitors. There, the Commission noted that the "case in large
part parallels American Medical Association," although "it presents an important additional factor. The advertising restraints here have the force of
law." 15 This statement makes sense only if optometry is a separate market;
otherwise, the Board's power to compel adherence to its regulations would
make little difference to consumers because they could turn to substitute
providers of care. The initial decision, however, recognizes that opticians
and ophthalmologists provide many of the same services as optometrists.
Optometrists may "diagnose, by any means except drugs, deficiencies in the
human eye disease and prescribe corrective lenses" and "sell and fit glasses
and contact lenses."" ' 6 Although ophthalmologists focus on eye disease and
surgery, they may perform any service that optometrists do. Similarly,
although opticians may not prescribe lenses, they sell and fit them, generally
in competition with an optometrist. Thus, the extent that opticians and ophthalmologists compete with optometrists apparently did not trouble the
Commission when it struck down these advertising restrictions-indicating
it is not necessary to define markets and show market power for Commission
action. Instead, the Commission primarily relies on an efficiency screen to
determine whether agreements among competitors can be condemned short
of a full rule of reason analysis.
D. FTC's Massachusetts Board Approach to Agreements
Among Competitors
The FTC has developed its own set of "filters" to channel cases more
likely to be anticompetitive into a "truncated" rule of reason analysis and to
channel cases less obviously anticompetitive into a full rule of reason analysis. The Massachusetts Board approach was in part designed to help clarify
the Supreme Court's rulings in cases such as BroadcastMusic, National Col114. A restraint is "unreasonable either because it fits within a class of restraints that has
been held to be 'per se' unreasonable, or because it violates what has come to be known as the
'Rule of Reason.'" Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 485
(1986). Using the rule of reason, the " 'test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
supress or even destroy competition.'" Id. (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
115. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 605 (1988).
116. Id. at 559.
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legiate Athletic Association, and Indiana Federation of Dentists, where the
agreements among competitors were not per se violations-but proved extremely difficult to analyze under a full rule of reason. It gives a "quick
look" to anticompetitive explanations before it focuses the main inquiry into
the existence of efficiencies. The approach attempts to simplify the analysis
by identifying cases where there are relatively few costs to avoiding the often
complex rule of reason questions of market definition, market power, and
how to weigh anticompetitive concerns against efficiencies. As such, the
Commission's truncated rule of reason approach or expanded per se analysis
can lead to a complaint without analyzing in detail the market power of the
group in question.
The MassachusettsBoard approach begins by asking if a practice is "inherently suspect," which does not require market definition or a detailed showing of market power.117 Only if the practice is not found to be "inherently
suspect" does the Commission apply the traditional rule of reason with market power tests. The inherently suspect step does, however, involve three
parts in establishing the potential for output restriction."' First, the Commission assumes that there are no offsetting efficiency considerations-the
efficiency inquiry is deferred until after the practice is determined to be "inherently suspect." Second, the Commission must determine whether there
exists a persuasive theory of how an agreement or rule could lead to an anticompetitive or "rent-creating" outcome, i.e., how the agreement or rule
leads to a "quality-adjusted" output restriction.' 9 Ceterisparibus, the more
complex and indirect the theory of output restriction, the less likely that the
rule or agreement will reduce output and the more likely the practice should
not be classified as inherently suspect. Finally, before labeling an agreement
or rule as inherently suspect, the Commission must find the existence of
some credible evidence that is consistent with the anticompetitive theory.
To make this determination, the Commission has relied on documents
clearly showing anticompetitive or rent-creating intent, market data demonstrating the output restricting effects of the agreement or rule, or clearly
documented or carefully researched experiences with similar rules in similar
markets that show these types of agreements restricting output. In Memorial Medical Center, for example, the obstetricians made the argument at the
117. Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. The theory of output restriction will imply that the group of competitors has some
degree of market power. The Massachusetts Board approach, however, does not require a
detailed analysis of the market power issue, as we discuss below. At most, the approach might
consider evidence indicating that the existence of market power is plausible. See D.K. Owen,
Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, Remarks at the Ohio State Bar Association,
Emerging Antitrust Enforcement in the 1990's (Nov. 16, 1990).
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Credential Committee meeting that granting privileges to the certified nursemidwife would cause an economic problem to young OB/GYN doctors.
This was documented in the minutes of the meeting, showing an anticompe20
titive intent to the action of privilege denial.'
Once a practice is labelled "inherently suspect," the second and third filters address the existence and validity of efficiencies, respectively. If efficiencies do not exist or are not valid, the practice is deemed unlawful.
The amount of evidence need not answer all the questions raised in a rule
of reason analysis. For example, rule of reason analysis usually requires the
establishment of clear product and geographic markets, the existence of barriers to entry, the ability of colluders to monitor output restricting agreements, and generally the ability and intent of an association or joint venture
to exercise market power. To establish a restraint as inherently suspect, the
Commission has not found it necessary to meet all of these evidentiary requirements. Instead, the Commission has relied on a few pieces of key evidence that are consistent with output restrictions and generally not
consistent with competition. These key pieces of evidence provide a "reality
check" on the theory. 12 ' Agencies may require relatively little evidentiary
support specific to the industry or association to conclude that an agreement
or rule is inherently suspect when dealing with familiar and well-understood
restraints such as price-fixing or customer allocation. However, this evidentiary requirement is particularly important where the Commission is relatively unfamiliar with the rules or the industry since, in these instances,
theory is less likely to be well-founded.
If there is persuasive evidence that the restriction has been used in an
anticompetitive or rent-creating fashion in a similar association or joint venture in a similar industry, relatively less evidence is needed to establish that a
rule or agreement is inherently suspect. For example, the Federal Trade
Commission followed the approach just outlined in Massachusetts Board. In
Massachusetts Board, the Commission did not address the possibility that
the restrictions were efficient until after it established they were inherently
suspect. It described how advertising restrictions on optometrists could result in higher prices without an increase in the quality of services-the
equivalent of a quality-adjusted output restriction. 122 To confirm the theory,
the Commission applied its experience with similar advertising restrictions
120. Medical Staff of Memorial Medical Center, 110 F.T.C. 541, 554 (1988).
121. Evidence for the "reality check" might include evidence of intent to deter innovations
by rivals, evidence that the group imposing the restraint is significant among sellers of similar
services, indications that the group has some inherent advantage in production relative to rival
groups or individuals, or evidence of enforcement of group restrictions.
122. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 576-77 (1988).
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in American Medical Association and the experience of the Supreme Court
with other professional groups to help determine if optometrists' advertising
restrictions were "inherently suspect." The Commission also relied heavily
on an economic study and other evidence that related specifically to optome12 3
trists to show the anticompetitive effects of the rules in question.
In Massachusetts Board, the amount of evidence used to show that the
rule restricted output fell short of what is normally required in a full rule of
reason analysis. The Commission did not perform a detailed analysis of geographic or product market definition, nor did it weigh evidence on the ease
of entry in either case. This reduced evidentiary burden is consistent with an
attempt to identify practices likely to be anticompetitive without engaging in
a full rule of reason analysis that would necessitate market definition and
other potentially complex analyses, which are prerequisites to determining
systematically market power and its exercise. However, the Commission did
require evidence that would permit it to distinguish between competition
and output reduction.
In this case, the second filter of the Commission was to determine if there
were any plausible efficiencies from the restriction. Similar to the inherently
suspect step, this filter asks for a credible theory of how the restriction increases output by lowering costs or improving the quality of services offered.
If there is no credible theory, then the inquiry ends and the restriction is
illegal.
Under the third filter, if there is an efficiency theory but the restriction is
not clearly tied to that theory or is excessively broad, then the restriction is
also illegal. For example, in Massachusetts Board, the Commission found
the Board's restrictions on price advertising, testimonials, and "flamboyant"
advertisements illegal because the Board offered "no plausible efficiency justification."' 2 4 The Commission also rejected respondent's procompetitive
123. In Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 108 F.T.C. 193 (1986), the Commission followed the
same procedure. Prior to considering efficiency arguments, the Commission investigated
whether the market-wide restriction of hours of operation was inherently suspect. The Com-

mission first articulated a theory of output restriction in terms of both common sense and
economic theory. The Commission also relied on evidence to confirm that the restriction reduced output. In particular, the Commission quoted the association's executive vice president
as stating "[the restricting of showroom hours has] improved [dealers'] grosses. This has been
brought about by the fact that with fewer shopping hours, the public can devote less time to
shopping, and consequently forcing down prices." At least two written statements by the
association confirmed this motivation and result from the coordinated reduction of retail
hours. In addition, the Commission cited numerous examples of enforcement of the rules
induced by the association's or direct dealers' action (complaint, initial decision, and opinion
of the Commision available from the FTC Public Reference Branch, H-130, 6th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580).
124. MassachusettsBd., 110 F.T.C. at 607.
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justifications for banning optometrists' advertising of their affiliations with
opticians. In general, antitrust policy seeks to encourage innovative and efficient forms of competition, while it forbids competitors to discourage them.
It is not surprising that the FTC found implausible the Commonwealth's
claim that it needed to prevent the growth of apparently efficient commercial
optometrists. 125
If the Commission had found these restrictions plausible, it next would
have questioned the validity of the efficiencies. Similar to the inherently suspect test, there has to be some evidence to validate theoretical efficiencies
before they are considered not just "plausible" but credible. Absent some
evidence confirming the efficiency, the Commission truncates its analysis and
finds the restriction illegal. If sufficient evidence exists, then the efficiency is
presumably valid even if that evidence does not quantify the cost savings or
product improvements-just as the Commission does not attempt to quantify "market power" in determining "inherently suspect." A finding of evidence showing validity triggers a full rule of reason analysis where the
Commission analyzes market power and attempts to quantify efficiencies
before deciding whether the restriction is on balance anticompetitive.
As can be seen in this brief description, the Massachusetts Board approach
addresses market power directly only if either the restraint is not inherently
suspect or there are valid efficiencies. The focus on efficiencies may be justified in the context of agreements among competitors because the agreements
are usually in place at the time of the investigation, and any efficiencies
should be ongoing and therefore somewhat easier to document than in a
merger case where any efficiencies are prospective. In addition, it may be
easier to determine that a restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve an
efficiency than to determine market power. Since a per se rule against agree125. The Commission also found the respondent's three efficiency justifications in Detroit
Auto Dealers to be implausible. First, the association argued that dealers needed to coordinate
and restrict the number of hours they were open to lower overhead costs. The Commission,
however, found that the restrictions did not lead to overall unit cost reductions. The second
claimed efficiency was to assist the ability of dealers to attract high quality sales personnel,
while the Commission found that an agreement among competitors is not a necessary condition for this efficiency to occur. Finally, the association alleged that it needed the restriction to
prevent unionization of dealers' salesmen, while the Commission found that preventing unionization cannot be upheld as an efficiency argument since unions legally have the right to exist
(complaint, initial decision, and opinion of the Commision available from the FTC Public
Reference Branch, H-130, 6th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580).
Given the high probability that these restrictions were anticompetitive-as demonstrated by
labelling them "inherently suspect"-it is difficult to see how a filter requiring a market power
analysis or a full rule of reason test would have been more efficient in determining their
legality.
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ments among competitors has no efficiency defense, the MassachusettsBoard
approach is less likely to condemn an agreement.
However, there may be some concern whether defendants carry too large
a burden of proof under such an approach.' 26 The Commission bears the
burden of proof to show a practice is "inherently suspect," but this is much
less difficult than a finding of market power. The reduced burden could lead
to a condemnation of agreements among competitors that would not be permitted under a market power filter where the plaintiff carries the burden of
proof. By focusing on efficiencies in Massachusetts Board, the court reduces
the evidentiary burden to show potentially anticompetitive effects. However,
no defendant's efficiency defense has been found "plausible" in the Commission's decisions that employ the MassachusettsBoard test. Accordingly, it is
unclear how large a burden a defendant must bear to show that efficiencies
27
are both plausible and valid, and therefore legal.'
E. Conclusion
At present, the law is unclear whether a per se prohibition, a rule of reason, or some other standard will be applied to various agreements among
competitors, including joint ventures and trade association rules. Some
agreements will usually be procompetitive, and those that would challenge
such agreements should bear the substantial burden of proof under a rule of
reason standard. Other agreements, such as price-fixing and market division, may be better left illegal per se. Between these two extremes exists a
"gray area" where judicial efficiency suggests the need for a systematic approach to agreements among competitors. These agreements may be handled under an approach that requires market power analysis if the case
involves a group of competitors who agree to a restriction that will effectively monopolize a market for the production of a particular good or service, such as a hospital privileges case. In other instances, a group of doctors
may agree to limit competition among themselves, and this may be governed
by the FTC's Massachusetts Board analysis. Similar to the guidance provided by the Merger Guidelines, the Massachusetts Board approach may offer an effective way to separate anticompetitive from efficient behavior in the
"gray areas." Unlike the Merger Guidelines, the MassachusettsBoard methodology focuses the inquiry on an efficiency rather than a market power
screen. Depending on the evidentiary burden in showing efficiencies, the approach could be closer to a per se standard banning agreements among com126. Coate, Horizontal Restraints in the Professions, ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming).

127. The Commission's evidentiary standard appears to be less than the "clear and convincing" standard required under the Merger Guidelines, but this has not been articulated.
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petitors than a rule of reason standard. Whether the Commission analyzes a
case under the MassachusettsBoard approach, economic analysis is critical
to determine whether these "gray area" cases are likely to enhance
competition.

